Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

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relevant principles, stating: ‘‘Before the [trial] court can
entertain a summary process action and evict a tenant,
the owner of the land must previously have served the
tenant with notice to quit. . . . As a condition prece-
dent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit
[pursuant to § 47a-23] is a jurisdictional necessity. . . .
This court’s review of the trial court’s determination as
to whether the notice to quit served by the plaintiff
effectively conferred subject matter jurisdiction is ple-
nary. . . .
‘‘We further observe that [s]ummary process is a spe-
cial statutory procedure designed to provide an expedi-
tious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain pos-
session of leased premises without suffering the delay,
loss and expense to which, under the common-law
actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully
holding over their terms. . . . Summary process stat-
utes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.
. . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro-
cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 808–809.
The court then addressed the merits of the claim,
stating: ‘‘The text of § 47a-23 is clear and unambiguous.
The legislature used language indicating that notice
shall be given by ‘owner or lessor, or the owner’s or
lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or lessor’s
attorney-at-law, or in-fact.’ In fact, three times in this
statutory section, the legislature identified ‘the owner’s
or lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or les-
sor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact’ as one category of indi-
viduals authorized by the statute to provide notice. The
use of the word ‘or’ in § 47a-23, instead of ‘and,’ suggests
‘in the alternative.’ Because the owner and the owner’s
legal representative both are included in the specific
array of possible individuals who might give notice, we
cannot see how the statute as written requires that the
notice to quit reflect both the owner’s identity and the
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