Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

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revised complaint identifies the plaintiff in the same
manner. The record reflects that, on February 10, 2022,
the plaintiff filed a motion to substitute party plaintiff
and to amend the revised complaint to substitute her-
self, in her individual capacity, as the party plaintiff in
light of the fact that the subject property was held jointly
between the plaintiff and the decedent with rights of
survivorship. The plaintiff represented that, upon the
decedent’s death in 2018, she became the sole owner
of the property. On February 14, 2022, the court granted
the motion.
The defendants argue that ‘‘[t]he undisputed evidence
in this case is that the property known as 40 Locust
[Street], Greenwich . . . was conveyed to [the dece-
dent] and [the plaintiff] jointly with rights of survivor-
ship on July 2, 1979. . . . Further, a purported lease
with respect to the premises, dated June 1, 2019, was
entered into evidence. The landlord on that lease was
‘Theresa K. Freccia.’ . . . In other words, everyone
was well aware that the property was never a part of
[the decedent’s] estate.
‘‘The . . . notice to quit [served on the defendants
in this summary process action] was signed by counsel
on behalf of the ‘Executor of the estate of Frank J.
Freccia, Jr.’ The estate was never an owner or manager
or attorney for the owner of 40 Locust [Street]. As such,
the notice to quit is defective on its face.’’ (Citations
omitted.)
The defendants further argue that, once the plaintiff
recognized that the wrong party had initiated the sum-
mary process action, ‘‘it was not enough to merely sub-
stitute [the plaintiff] personally in lieu of the estate. A
new notice to quit needs to be served. . . . The failure
to serve a notice to quit in the name of the actual owner
of the premises renders it defective and invalid.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted.) The defendants contend that, ‘‘[because]
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