Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

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the notice to quit in this case is defective on its face,
          and since a valid notice to quit is a jurisdictional prereq-
          uisite to the case, both the Superior Court and this
          Appellate Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter-
          tain the matter.’’13
             The plaintiff counters that the defendants are chal-
          lenging the validity of the notice to quit for the first
          time in this appeal and, thus, that the claim should not
          be reviewed. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the
          alleged defect did not implicate the subject matter juris-
          diction of the trial court and that the notice to quit was
          not necessarily defective in the manner argued because,
          pursuant to § 47a-23 (a), the notice need only have
          included the name of the owner’s legal representative,
          attorney-at-law, or attorney-in-fact, and ‘‘it is impossible
          to know whether the court considered [Sank], who
          indisputably issued and signed the notice to quit, [as]
          the attorney-at-law for the owner [of the subject prop-
          erty], [the plaintiff in her individual capacity], or for
          the lessor [of the subject property], [the plaintiff as
          executor of the decedent’s estate], or for both.’’
            13
               The defendants’ argument in AC 46038 is peculiar in that they argue
          that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal that they
          themselves brought before this court. It cannot be disputed that, if this
          court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their appeal, the proper course
          of action would be for this court to dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., T.P. Brewer
          Construction Co. v. F & G Associates, 34 Conn. App. 714, 716, 643 A.2d 308
          (1994) (‘‘[b]ecause this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we must
          dismiss the appeal’’). It follows, therefore, that in the absence of appellate
          jurisdiction, we would be incapable of providing the defendants the remedy
          that they explicitly ask us to afford them, namely, to vacate the underlying
          judgment granting the plaintiff possession of the subject property and to
          direct the trial court to dismiss the action.
            The arguments raised by the defendants call into question whether the
          plaintiff properly invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court, but they do not
          call into question whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the present
          appeal from the final judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the
          plaintiff. See Herasimovich v. Wallingford, 149 Conn. App. 325, 327 n.2, 87
          A.3d 1177 (2014) (‘‘[t]his court has jurisdiction over any final judgment of
          the Superior Court even if that court lacked jurisdiction’’).
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