Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

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served on the defendant to vacate the premises on or
          before a certain date; and (4) although the time given
          the defendant to vacate in the notice to quit possession
          has passed, the defendant remains in possession of the
          premises. See General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) (3).
             ‘‘As a threshold issue, in order to prevail, the plaintiff
          must prove the essential element of ownership of the
          premises, which implicates standing. It is well estab-
          lished that [a] party must have standing to assert a
          claim in order for the court to have subject matter
          jurisdiction . . . . Standing is the legal right to set judi-
          cial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke
          the jurisdiction of the court unless he . . . has, in an
          individual or representative capacity, some real interest
          in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title
          or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
          . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is
          whether the person whose standing is challenged is a
          proper party to request an adjudication of the issue
          . . . .
             ‘‘Section 47a-23 (a) provides in relevant part: When
          the owner . . . desires to obtain possession or occu-
          pancy of any land . . . and . . . (3) when one origi-
          nally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises
          but such right or privilege has terminated . . . such
          owner . . . shall give notice to each . . . occupant to
          quit possession or occupancy of such land . . . before
          the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occu-
          pant to quit possession or occupancy. General Statutes
          § 47a-1 (e) defines owner as one or more persons, jointly
          or severally, in whom is vested (1) all or part of the
          legal title to property, or (2) all or part of the beneficial
          ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of
          the premises and includes a mortgagee in possession.
          Vested is defined as [h]aving become a completed, con-
          summated right for present or future enjoyment; not
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