Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

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evidence ‘‘create[d] life estates’’ in any of the defendants
       and that it was appropriate in this case to focus on the
       will and the trust as the clearest expression of the intent
       of the decedent. It is particularly persuasive that article
       VI, paragraph B, of the trust, captioned ‘‘Discretionary
       Termination of Trust,’’ provides: ‘‘The [g]rantor recog-
       nizes that there may be circumstances in which it is
       not in the best interests of the income beneficiary of a
       trust established hereunder to continue such trust in
       existence, taking into account all relevant factors,
       including the costs of administration and any tax bene-
       fits or lack thereof. Accordingly, after the [g]rantor’s
       death, the [t]rustee is authorized in its discretion and
       for any reason to terminate the trust and distribute any
       remaining trust property to the income beneficiary. In
       exercising its discretion, the [t]rustee shall have no
       obligation to consider the interests of any other person
       in the trust.’’9 As the court correctly recognized on the
       basis of the undisputed evidence of the estate plan of
       the decedent, he could have provided greater rights in
       the defendants as beneficiaries of his will and trust, but
       he did not do so.10
         9
            The defendants in AC 46037 attach great importance to article IX, para-
       graph V, of the trust, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘The [t]rustee is
       authorized to hold residential real property as part of any trust created
       under this [a]greement and shall permit the income beneficiary or eligible
       income beneficiaries to reside there rent-free during the trust term. . . .’’
       The defendants, however, fail to acknowledge the very next sentence of
       that section, which clearly reflects that the plaintiff, in her discretion, had
       the authority to sell any residential real property, by providing: ‘‘The
       [g]rantor, and after the [g]rantor’s death, the [g]rantor’s spouse if the [g]rant-
       or’s spouse is the income beneficiary or an eligible income beneficiary, may
       at any time direct that such residential property shall be sold.’’
          10
             We briefly respond to the defendants’ reliance in AC 46037 on our
       Supreme Court’s decision in Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 804 A.2d 170
       (2002), which they assert is ‘‘ ‘on all fours’ ’’ with the claim before us. In
       Gaynor, our Supreme Court concluded that a decedent’s grandchildren,
       who were contingent remaindermen by virtue of a trust established by the
       decedent’s will, nonetheless held legally cognizable property interests in
       the decedent’s estate. Id., 592–93. Therefore, the court concluded, their
       rights to bring an action against the former executor of the decedent’s estate
       for mismanagement were not extinguished by a release executed by the
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