Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

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do so with ‘‘no obligation’’ to consider any other benefi-
       ciary of the trust, undermines the argument that the
       court should have recognized the existence of a con-
       structive trust.
          Third, the defendants argue that the doctrine of prom-
       issory estoppel required a determination that Guin was
       entitled to remain in the family business. ‘‘[U]nder the
       doctrine of promissory estoppel, [a] promise which the
       promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
       forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third per-
       son and which does induce such action or forbearance
       is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
       ment of the promise. A fundamental element of promis-
       sory estoppel, therefore, is the existence of a clear and
       definite promise which a promisor could reasonably
       have expected to induce reliance. Thus, a promisor is
       not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise
       if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason
       to expect any reliance at all. . . . Further, the promise
       must reflect a present intent to commit as distinguished
       from a mere statement of intent to contract in the future.
       . . . [A] mere expression of intention, hope, desire, or
       opinion, which shows no real commitment, cannot be
       expected to induce reliance . . . . Additionally,
       [a]side from demonstrating the existence of a clear and
       definite promise, a plaintiff asserting a claim of promis-
       sory estoppel must also establish two additional ele-
       ments: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must
       do or say something calculated or intended to induce
       another party to believe that certain facts exist and to
       act on that belief; and the other party must change its
       position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring
       some injury. . . . It is fundamental that a person who
       claims an estoppel must show that he has exercised
       due diligence to know the truth, and that he not only
       did not know the true state of things but also lacked any
       reasonably available means of acquiring knowledge.’’
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