Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

Full Text

2,713 chars

Second, the defendants argue that the circumstances
          compel the conclusion that Guin is the beneficiary of
          ‘‘a classic constructive trust’’ based on promises and
          assurances made to her by the decedent. ‘‘The elements
          of a constructive trust are the intent by a grantor to
          benefit a third person, the transfer of property to
          another who stands in a confidential relationship to the
          grantor with the intent that the transferee will transfer
          the property to the third person, and the unjust enrich-
          ment of the transferee if the transferee is allowed to
          keep the property. A constructive trust is created by
          operation of law when these elements are present.’’
          Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn. App. 305, 310, 620 A.2d
          181 (1993). Here, the court specifically found that the
          defendants had not proven the existence of any ‘‘life-
          time promises’’ whereby the defendants were promised
          the right to occupy the subject premises beyond the
          lifetime of the decedent. The court also found that the
          defendants did not present evidence indicating that the
          decedent had ‘‘conveyed, or intended to convey, the
          ownership of any of the parcels in question in this
          matter to his children/grandchildren in occupancy
          thereof.’’ As the court explained, there was no evidence
          that the decedent had ‘‘[left] any instructions to the
          plaintiff to allow possession ‘forever’ to any [of the]
          defendants herein.’’ As we have stated previously in
          this opinion, the fact that the trust clearly afforded the
          trustee the discretion to terminate the trust for the sole
          benefit of the plaintiff, as income beneficiary, and to
          decedent’s children alone, in favor of the former executor. Id., 594. The
          issue addressed in Gaynor is not analogous to the issue before us. We
          are being asked to determine whether equitable considerations barred the
          plaintiff from being awarded immediate possession of the subject property,
          not whether the defendants properly may commence an action against the
          plaintiff in her role as executor or trustee. We do not conclude that any of
          the defendants who are beneficiaries under the will or trust lack interests
          in the subject property; instead, we conclude that such interests do not
          preclude the plaintiff from obtaining immediate possession of the subject
          property.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                     Page 21

Other Sections in This Document (93)

Full Text