Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)

Citation: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Parent Document: Freccia v. Freccia, 232 Conn. App. 353 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-05-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10513133/freccia-v-freccia/ ↗

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subject residence, as those instruments do not reflect
       that the decedent had contemplated such an outcome.
                                     C
         The defendants in AC 46037 also claim that the court
       abused its discretion and prejudiced them by consol-
       idating for trial the action underlying this appeal with
       four other related summary process actions brought by
       the plaintiff in either her individual or representative
       capacity. We decline to reach the merits of this claim,
       as it is unpreserved.
          The defendants argue that the court’s decision to
       consolidate the summary process actions was made
       without any ‘‘significant consideration at all’’ and that
       it resulted in a ‘‘procedural ‘mishmash’ . . . .’’ They
       also argue that the ruling was prejudicial because,
       despite the fact that the cases were related in that they
       were all summary process cases brought by the plaintiff
       against family members and there was uniformity of
       counsel (and, to some degree, uniformity of defenses)
       with respect to the cases consolidated, in light of ‘‘the
       complexities of the matter, the differences between the
       parties, the differences between legal theories, and the
       potential antagonism between various claims and
       defenses . . . consolidation was inappropriate and
       . . . [was an] abuse of discretion.’’
         The plaintiff challenges the reviewability of this claim
       on the ground that it was not distinctly raised before
       the trial court. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and
       rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s
       review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial. . . .
       [O]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and
       will this court consider a claim, constitutional or other-
       wise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial
       court. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit
       a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been
       raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the
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