Section 425

Citation: Section 425
Parent Document: Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2011-06-27
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5810370/wallace-v-mccubbin/ ↗

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The other cases on which Wallace and Owen rely are readily distinguishable as well. In Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Pearl Street, LLC (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312, 1318 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 903] (Pearl Street), a rent control board filed a lawsuit against a landlord for charging illegal rents; the court held that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because the claim was not based, on protected activity. In Marlin, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pages 157-158, a tenant lawsuit against a number of landlords sought a judicial declaration of rights with respect to the landlords’ rights to evict them under the Ellis Act; the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply, because the challenge was not to the landlords’ protected activity of filing an unlawful detainer action or prerequisite termination notice, but on whether the Ellis Act granted authority for termination of the tenancy. Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1286, 1289-1290 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 24] (Clark) held that a tenant’s causes of action did not fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, because they were not premised on the landlords’ protected activity of prosecuting an unlawful detainer action, but on the claim that the landlord removed the apartment from the market and fraudulently evicted the tenant to install a family member who never moved in—a claim which could only be raised after the landlord accomplished the eviction—such that the eviction notices and unlawful detainer were merely background to the landlord’s subsequent violation of the rent ordinance and statute. (As to Clark, McCubbin and Merck filed a request for judicial notice (Sept. 20, 2010), asking us to take judicial notice of the complaint in Clark on the ground it was necessary to explain what *1193they believe are analytical errors in Clark. We now grant the request for judicial notice but do not rely on the complaint in rendering our decision, because Clark is distinguishable on its facts.)

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