Section 425

Citation: Section 425
Parent Document: Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2011-06-27
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5810370/wallace-v-mccubbin/ ↗

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The concurring and dissenting opinion further contends that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence insulates Mann from judicial reconsideration, because the Legislature amended section 425.16 twice after Mann was decided. In enacting those amendments, however, the Legislature did not address the relevant section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), never mentioned Mann, and said nothing about what a plaintiff must do to establish a probability of prevailing in the context of a mixed cause of action. To the *1208contrary, in 2005—the year after Mann was decided—the Legislature explicitly noted its intent to overrule the holdings of other cases on an entirely different point. (See Stats. 2005, ch. 535, § 3, p. 4123.) Much more than this is required for legislative acquiescence. (Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1108 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 847 P.2d 560] [more than mere silence is required before an inference of acquiescence is elevated to implied legislation; legislative inaction is “ ‘ “ ‘ “a weak reed upon which to lean” ’ ” ’ ”]; cf. Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 804, 816 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 86 P.3d 354] [principle of legislative acquiescence applied where the Legislature reenacted a statute after judicial decisions construed it, and the legislative history of the reenactment expressly acknowledged those decisions].) We therefore turn to what our Supreme Court said in Taus. e. The Lessons of Taus

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