Section 425
- Citation
- Section 425
- Parent Document
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 2011-06-27
Other Sections in This Document (190)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
- Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2011)
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Full Text
1,534 charsAnd that is precisely what our Supreme Court did. The court concluded that “the Court of Appeal erred in finding that plaintiff had satisfied her burden of establishing a prima facie case on any cause of action based on” three of the four instances of protected conduct, but the Court of Appeal was correct that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case as to the fourth. (Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 715, 742.) By way of summary, the Supreme Court asserted: .“Finally, although we have determined that defendants’ motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute properly was denied as to one facet of one of the numerous causes of action alleged in the complaint, it is apparent when the determinations of the Court of Appeal and this court are viewed as a whole that the overwhelming majority of plaintiff’s claims properly should have been struck in the trial court under the anti-SLAPP statute. Under these circumstances, and consistent with the fundamental purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute to minimize the chilling of conduct undertaken in furtherance of the constitutional right of free speech, we conclude that it is appropriate to award defendants their costs on appeal.” (Id. at pp. 742-743, italics added.) In short, our Supreme Court ruled that, in response to an anti-SLAPP motion brought as to an entire complaint containing several causes of action, a part of a cause of action could be struck because the plaintiff failed to establish a probability of prevailing as to that particular part.