Subdiv. (1): Good faith not exculpatory under statute; target of fair employment legislation is the effect, not the purpose, of discrimination. 188 C. 44. Cited. 198 C. 479; 202 C. 150; 211 C. 464; 220 C. 307; 228 C. 545; 231 C. 328. Subdiv. (1): Sec. 46a-86 does not authorize award of damages for emotional distress and attorneys' fees for violation of this section. 232 C. 91. Cited. Id., 117; 236 C. 250; 237 C. 209. Section does not expressly obligate employer to accommodate employee's work-at-home requests, or to refrain from taking adverse action against employee who persists in efforts to secure such arrangement. 249 C. 766. Subdiv. (1) does not impose liability on individual employees. 259 C. 729. Because Fair Employment Practices Act clearly expresses a public policy determination by legislature that employers with fewer than 3 employees shall be exempt from liability for discrimination on the basis of sex, including pregnancy-related discrimination, a common-law claim for wrongful discharge on the basis of pregnancy will not lie against such employers. 260 C. 691. Trial court should not have remanded case to referee because employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff was denied promotion because of failure to obtain same license as required for prior job occupants and where license requirement was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and not pretextual. 272 C. 457. Subdiv. (1) imposes a duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation to their disabled employees. 286 C. 390. Plaintiff had no standing under statute because as a recipient of surviving spouse pension allowance, plaintiff was not within a class of persons statute was intended to protect; section pertains only to those persons who have sought or obtained an employment