Section 45-1561

Citation: Section 45-1561
Parent Document: Habib v. Thurston, 517 A.2d 1 (1986)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1986-10-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1995493/habib-v-thurston/ ↗

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It is helpful to note at this juncture how the trial courts have handled McNeal hearings when a jury has decided the possesso-ry action. When the tenant elects a jury trial in a nonpayment case, and the appropriate branch or division of the court does not grant summary judgment or a directed verdict, we understand that some judges permit the jury not only to decide the merits of the landlord’s complaint, including the tenant’s Javins defenses, but also to decide, under McNeal, how the money es-crowed under the protective order during the litigation period should be apportioned in view of the evidence, if any, of continuing code violations. Cf. District of Columbia v. Daniel, 111 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 621, 625 (D.C.Super.Ct. Feb. 18, 1983) (constitutional right to jury trial on counterclaim for rent abatement from three years before suit through period of protective order to time of trial) (Salzman, J.); see also Bell, 139 U.S.App.D.C. at 112, 430 F.2d at 485; Javins, 138 U.S.App.D.C. at 381 n. 67, 428 F.2d at 1083 n. 67. (Conceptually, this approach also could be deemed tantamount to a tenant’s amendment of the pleadings to assert a Javins counterclaim for the entire period of the landlord’s complaint through the litigation period, theoretically eclipsing the need for a separate McNeal hearing.)

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