he may enter."]). That is, a landlord's choice to preserve its right of access, which by
definition diminishes a tenant's exclusivity, brings attendant consequences for the
landlord.
Here, the Corporation preserved its right of access and specified (and secured)
Plaintiff's keys as the means to facilitate access, and thus must bear the burden of its
choice: the attendant duty to utilize its access when the circumstances so require
(cf Sanders v Patrick, 94
AD3d 1514, [*8]1515 [4th Dept 2012] [in the
absence of a written agreement, consistent testimony of multiple parties led to a finding
that the landlord, despite possessing the tenant's keys, could only enter with tenant's
permission]).
To the extent that the Corporation argues that the right of re-entry in Paragraph 25 of
the Lease and Amended Lease "do[es] not impose any responsibility or liability for the
care or supervision of the apartment, or any of the pipes, fixtures, appliances or
appurtenances therein contained ," this Court interprets the provision to mean that the
right of re-entry alone does not impute liability for the Apartment's interior to the
Corporation. The Court holds, however, that the right of re-entry, coupled with the
Corporation's knowledge of the Apartment's condition and obligation to repair it, creates
liability. As the Corporation argues, however, when it attempted to exercise its right of
re-entry by providing notice to Plaintiff, their access was actively impeded by Plaintiff's
denial of access.
b. Plaintiff's denial of access
The warranty of habitability applies only to areas that are "within the landlord's
control" (12-14 E. 64th Owners
Corp. v Hixon, 130 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2015], citing Park W. Mgt.