Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2021-09-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6244827/scholz-v-epstein/ ↗

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to the mortgaged premises has become absolute in the
          mortgagee, or any person claiming under him, he shall,
          either in person or by his agent or attorney, forthwith
          make and sign a certificate describing the premises
          foreclosed, the deed of mortgage on which the foreclo-
          sure was had, the book and page where the same was
          recorded and the time when the mortgage title became
          absolute. The certificate shall be recorded in the
          records of the town where the premises are situated
          . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Under the clear language of
          § 49-16, recording the certificate of foreclosure in the
          land records is a statutory requirement in a foreclosure
          proceeding and, thus, is conducted in connection with
          and as a required step in the foreclosure proceeding.
             As for the defendant’s conduct in assisting Bench-
          mark with the sale of the property to a third party, the
          plaintiff argues that Benchmark was not required to
          sell the property and could have held title to it perma-
          nently and, therefore, that this conduct was an entirely
          unnecessary postproceeding action. The plaintiff’s
          argument, however, does not fully address the Appellate
          Court’s rationale. The Appellate Court held that,
          because the plaintiff’s complaint did not contain any
          allegations of improper conduct by the defendant in
          relation to this sale, the plaintiff’s argument lacked
          merit. Scholz v. Epstein, supra, 198 Conn. 230–31. Alter-
          natively, the Appellate Court held that, even if the allega-
          tions in the complaint were sufficient to raise this claim,
          the sale of the foreclosed property was an integral step
          in the foreclosure proceeding. Id., 231.
             We agree with the Appellate Court that the plaintiff’s
          argument lacks merit because his complaint does not
          allege that the defendant committed statutory theft
          based on his actions in relation to the sale of the prop-
          erty to a third party. Not only does the complaint not
          allege that the defendant committed any misconduct in
          relation to this sale, but it is void of any allegation that
the defendant was involved in the sale in any way.
The complaint alleges only that Benchmark sold the
property to a third party. Thus, because the plaintiff
never alleged that his claim of statutory theft was prem-
ised on the defendant’s misconduct in relation to the
sale of the property, the plaintiff’s argument fails, and
we need not determine whether such misconduct would
fall within the scope of the foreclosure proceedings.
  The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
  In this opinion the other justices concurred. --- 010combined ---

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