Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2021-09-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6244827/scholz-v-epstein/ ↗

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advocacy but, rather, noted that the purpose of the
privilege is to provide immunity from having to defend
such advocacy decisions, even if that means immunity
occasionally applies to misconduct. See Simms v. Sea-
man, supra, 308 Conn. 539, 546–47 and n.14.
Thus, in determining whether the plaintiff’s claim
challenges the purpose of an underlying judicial pro-
ceeding, we look at the elements of the claim itself.
See id., 542–43; see also MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti,
supra, 310 Conn. 633–34. Unlike claims for vexatious
litigation and abuse of process, the elements of statu-
tory theft do not anticipate a challenge to an underlying
judicial proceeding but, rather, require that the plaintiff
establish that the defendant stole his property or
received and concealed stolen property. See General
Statutes § 52-564; see also part II B of this opinion. It
is clear from the elements of the cause of action that
the plaintiff’s claim of statutory theft does not challenge
the purpose of the underlying judicial proceeding.
The plaintiff admits that the underlying foreclosure
proceeding was properly brought because he had not
paid taxes on his property. Nevertheless, he argues that
his claim does challenge the purpose of the underlying
proceedings because he alleges that, through the
alleged misconduct, the defendant hijacked the judicial
proceedings for a purpose other than that for which they
were intended.5 Not only does this argument improperly
focus on the allegations rather than the cause of action,
but this argument, if correct, would render this privilege
5
Further, to the extent the plaintiff is arguing that he alleged in his
complaint that the defendant improperly used the courts, in that the defen-
dant’s conduct in the underlying litigation constituted an abuse of process,
such an allegation is not sufficient to bar the litigation privilege, but, rather,
the plaintiff was required to, but did not, set forth sufficient allegations to
establish a cause of action for abuse of process. See Mozzochi v. Beck, 204
Conn. 490, 494–98, 529 A.2d 171 (1987); see also Perugini v. Giuliano, 148
Conn. App. 861, 874, 89 A.3d 358 (2014) (noting that plaintiff may have been
able to, but did not, assert abuse of process claim).
Page 46 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL January 25, 2022

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