Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2021-09-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6244827/scholz-v-epstein/ ↗

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Since deciding Simms, this court has clarified that
these factors and considerations are ‘‘simply instruc-
tive,’’ with the focus being on ‘‘the issues relevant to
the competing interests in each case’’ in light of the
‘‘particular context’’ of the case.2 (Internal quotation
2
For example, in MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 630–31,
this court held that absolute immunity did not bar a claim of employer
retaliation. In MacDermid, Inc., the plaintiff employer had filed an action
for civil theft, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion, premised on the
defendant employee’s conduct in relation to his workers’ compensation
claim. Id., 622. The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the plaintiff
violated General Statutes § 31-290a by initiating the underlying action solely
in retaliation for his exercise of his rights under the Workers’ Compensation
Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. Id. The plaintiff moved to dismiss
the counterclaim, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over that claim because the act of filing an action is protected by the doctrine
of absolute immunity. Id. In holding that the litigation privilege did not apply
to a claim alleging a violation of § 31-290a, we noted that the cause of action
did not include the same stringent requirements and balancing of interests
as a claim of vexatious litigation. Id., 632–33. Nevertheless, we determined
that the policy underlying § 31-290a was similar to the policy vindicated by
a vexatious litigation claim. Id., 631, 635. Just as vexatious litigation prohibits
an individual from using the litigation process for an illegitimate purpose,
§ 31-290a prohibits an employer from initiating an action against an employee
for the illegitimate purpose of retaliating against the employee for the
employee’s exercise of his or her rights under the act. Id. Additionally, we
relied heavily on the fact that, not only would barring immunity not open the
floodgates to retaliatory claims against employers, but providing immunity
actually would deter employees from exercising their rights under the act.
Id., 635–36; see also id., 625 n.7.
Page 42 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL January 25, 2022

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