Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2021-09-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6244827/scholz-v-epstein/ ↗

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We now turn to the final factor in determining
whether the alleged conduct may be addressed by other
available remedies. In Simms, we found it significant
that there were safeguards in place, other than civil
liability, to deter or prevent attorney misconduct or to
provide relief from that misconduct. Simms v. Seaman,
supra, 308 Conn. 552.13 The plaintiff argues that these
remedies either were not available to him or are not
adequate remedies in the present case because they
cannot sufficiently compensate him for the defendant’s
improper conduct.
For example, although he recognizes that he could
have brought a collateral proceeding to challenge the
defendant’s allegedly fraudulent actions,14 the plaintiff
argues that this remedy would not have been swift
enough for him to regain his property and to continue
his business in a timely fashion. See Merry-Go-Round
Enterprises, Inc. v. Molnar, 10 Conn. App. 160, 162
n.1, 521 A.2d 1065 (1987); see also Hoey v. Investors’
13
For example, in Simms, a case involving an award of alimony, we
indicated that a ‘‘dissatisfied litigant may file a motion to open the judgment’’
or otherwise ask the court for relief from the award affected by an attorney’s
misconduct. Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 552. Further, the plaintiff
in Simms could file ‘‘a grievance against the offending attorney under the
Rules of Professional Conduct’’ or ask the trial court to exercise its inherent
authority to impose sanctions in connection with an attorney’s fraudulent
conduct. Id.
14
The plaintiff also argued at oral argument before this court that he was
not able to bring a motion to open on the ground of fraud. In a recent case,
although it involved different facts, this court held that a plaintiff may move
to open a judgment of strict foreclosure on the basis of fraud after the
passing of the law days under General Statutes § 49-15. See U.S. Bank
National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 379 and n.11, 260 A.3d 1187
(2021) (‘‘courts may, in rare and exceptional cases, exercise a limited form of
continuing jurisdiction over motions to open judgments of strict foreclosure
after the passage of the law days, notwithstanding the statutory limitation
imposed by § 49-15,’’ and the motion to open must set forth ‘‘particularized
factual allegations that could support a claim cognizable in equity,’’ including
a claim of fraud, accident, mistake, or surprise).
January 25, 2022 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 55

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