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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation
Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document
Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2021-09-29

Other Sections in This Document (72)

Full Text

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374 F. Supp. 3d 462, 493 (W.D. Pa. 2019); Beardmore
         v. Jacobsen, 131 F. Supp. 3d 656, 669 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
         Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC,
         supra, 213; Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279
         Conn. 745, 771, 905 A.2d 623 (2006); Yuille v. Parnoff,
         189 Conn. App. 124, 137 n.11, 206 A.3d 766, cert. denied,
         332 Conn. 902, 208 A.3d 659 (2019).
            Although some of these cases may be distinguishable
         from the present case in that they involved conversion
         and not statutory civil theft or did not involve theft
         by an attorney, none of them supports the opposite
         conclusion. To the contrary, the plaintiff has not cited,
         and this court has not discovered, any federal or state
         court decision holding that absolute immunity does not
         apply to a claim of statutory theft or a similar type of
         claim. Accordingly, considering all of the public policy
         concerns raised by the parties—including those raised
         in Simms and others unique to the present case—we
         conclude that the Appellate Court correctly determined
         that the litigation privilege applies to bar the plaintiff’s
         statutory theft claim.
                                      III
            Finally, the plaintiff argues that, even if the litigation
         privilege applies to claims of statutory theft, the privi-
         lege does not apply in the present case to the extent
         his claim is premised on the defendant’s delayed
         recording of the certificate of foreclosure on the land
         records and his role in the subsequent sale of the prop-
         erty, because this conduct occurred outside the scope
         of the foreclosure action. The plaintiff argues that, once
         title vested in Benchmark after the running of the law
         days, the foreclosure proceeding reached its final dispo-
         sition, and anything that occurred afterward was not
         part of the foreclosure proceeding. The defendant dis-
         agrees that the conduct alleged was not sufficiently
Page 58                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                            January 25, 2022