Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Citation
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Parent Document
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 2021-09-29
Other Sections in This Document (72)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
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- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
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- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
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- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
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- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
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- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
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- Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Full Text
2,662 charsproof of specific intent. Contrary to the plaintiff’s asser-
tion, however, this intent element does not make the
plaintiff’s claim distinguishable and unique, as this court
has applied absolute immunity to other torts that have
specific intent elements, such as fraud and tortious
interference.11 See id., 548; Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn.
338, 351, 927 A.2d 304 (2007). Additionally, the fact that
specific intent is difficult to prove makes a claim of
statutory theft similar to claims of defamation and
fraud—it is easy to allege but difficult to prove. A dis-
gruntled litigant could easily bring a claim for statutory
theft to falsely allege that an attorney’s improper con-
duct affected the outcome of the litigation and, thus,
led to property changing hands—either because of a
judgment of foreclosure or an award for damages. Thus,
a statutory theft claim does not have built-in safeguards
in place similar to those built into a claim of vexa-
tious litigation.
The plaintiff maintains that his statutory theft claim
is different from a defamation or fraud claim in that ‘‘it
involves a series of calculated acts of dishonesty
. . . .’’ All of these claims, however, are premised on
false communications. This court has held that absolute
immunity applies even if communications are false or
malicious. See Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn.
539–40. We have never suggested that the degree of
dishonesty is a relevant factor. Moreover, the alleged
dishonesty in this case is similar to that alleged in
Simms. In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the
11
The plaintiff, however, argues that a claim of statutory theft is unique
in that it is criminal in nature. Although theft may serve as a ground for
criminal charges, the claim at issue is civil in nature. Moreover, this court also
has applied absolute immunity to other torts that have criminal counterparts,
such as fraud. See Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 568–69; see also
General Statutes § 53a-119 (larceny defined to include various kinds of
fraudulent activity); General Statutes § 53a-125c (telephone fraud); General
Statutes § 53a-215 (insurance fraud); General Statutes § 53a-291 (vendor
fraud).
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