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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation
Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document
Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2021-09-29

Other Sections in This Document (72)

Full Text

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the underlying purpose of the litigation and claims chal-
          lenging the attorney’s role as an advocate for her or his
          client. See Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 546.
          ‘‘[W]e have refused to apply absolute immunity to
          causes of action alleging the improper use of the judicial
          system’’ but have applied immunity to claims premised
          on factual allegations that challenge the defendant’s
          participation in a properly brought judicial proceeding.
          MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 629. The
          former involves the improper use of the courts ‘‘to
          accomplish a purpose for which [the courts were] not
          designed’’ and is therefore not protected by the litiga-
          tion privilege. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
          Simms v. Seaman, supra, 546. The latter does not
          involve consideration of whether the underlying pur-
          pose of the litigation was improper and, thus, is entitled
          to absolute immunity, even if the plaintiff alleges that
          the attorney’s conduct constituted an improper use of
          the courts. Id., 546–47. That is to say, it is not enough
          for the plaintiff to allege that the misconduct at issue
          constituted an abuse of the legal system, but, rather,
          the cause of action itself must challenge the purpose
          of the underlying litigation. Tyler v. Tatoian, supra,
          164 Conn. App. 93. Thus, the privilege absolutely bars
          causes of action arising from attorney advocacy. See,
          e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 628.
             For example, in Simms, although the plaintiff alleged
          that the defendants’ conduct was improper—the alleged
          fraud done on behalf of the client for her financial
          benefit to his financial detriment—his fraud claim did
          not challenge the purpose of the underlying divorce
          proceeding, and, thus, we held that the plaintiff’s fraud
          claim merely challenged the defendants’ conduct while
          representing or advocating for a client, conduct for
          which they were absolutely immune. In determining
          whether the privilege applied in Simms, we did not
          assess whether the alleged misconduct was proper
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