Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2021-09-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6244827/scholz-v-epstein/ ↗

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Mortgage & Guaranty Co., 118 Conn. 226, 230–31, 171 A.
438 (1934). That the plaintiff determined, for whatever
reason, to forgo this option does not render this rem-
edy insufficient.
The plaintiff also argues that a grievance proceeding
is an insufficient remedy because an attorney repri-
mand, suspension or disbarment would not make him
whole. He recognizes that he may seek restitution in a
grievance proceeding; see Practice Book § 2-37 (a) (2);
but dismisses this remedy as rare. Moreover, he argues
that he attempted to use this remedy but that his griev-
ance proceeding was dismissed and, thus, was an insuf-
ficient remedy. Because these other remedies are
inadequate, according to the plaintiff, applying immu-
nity to statutory theft claims would open the floodgates
to thieving attorneys.15
Although, as discussed in part II A of this opinion,
we in no way condone the conduct that the plaintiff
has alleged and must assume it is true, we do not agree
that these other remedies—remedies that both protect
against such attorney misconduct and compensate indi-
viduals harmed—are not adequate. Nor are we per-
suaded that the unavailability of the preferred remedy—
a statutory theft claim—will provide attorneys with a
‘‘license to steal . . . .’’ The fact that restitution in a
grievance proceeding may be rare does not mean that
this remedy is inadequate to compensate the plaintiff,
especially if the defendant’s conduct was in fact as
15
The plaintiff also argues that he has inadequate alternative remedies
because he could not bring an abuse of process claim given that the underly-
ing foreclosure proceeding was properly brought. We note that whether the
plaintiff could have brought an abuse of process claim against the defendant
in the present case is an open question in Connecticut, as this court has
not yet addressed the issue of ‘‘the scope of the term process’’ as that relates
to an action for abuse of process. Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394,
408, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). We need not decide this issue, however, given the
other remedies available to the plaintiff to both punish the alleged conduct
and to cure any resulting harm.
Page 56 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL January 25, 2022

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