Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)

Citation: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Parent Document: Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2021-09-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6244827/scholz-v-epstein/ ↗

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was made on the plaintiff. Further, the return of service
         did not describe any effort by the state marshal to locate
         the plaintiff, or any attempt to effect service on him,
         notwithstanding that the defendant himself knew through-
         out the foreclosure proceeding that the plaintiff resided
         at 405 Helen Street.1
            The defendant then cited in the plaintiff as a defen-
         dant in the foreclosure proceeding, representing the
         following to the trial court: ‘‘[1] at the time the action
         was commenced, he believed that . . . [the plaintiff]
         had been properly served; [2] [the plaintiff] was unable
         to be served; [3] [the defendant] directed a state marshal
         to effectuate service [on the plaintiff], but [the plaintiff]
         was not at any of the ‘possible locations’; [4] [the defen-
         dant] had done his due diligence in trying to locate [the
         plaintiff], but ‘all possible locations’ had been exhausted
         . . . [5] the notice most likely to come to the attention
         of [the plaintiff] was the publication of an order of
         notice of the institution of the foreclosure action in
         the Connecticut Post, a newspaper circulated in the
         Bridgeport area, once a week for two successive weeks;
         and [6] ‘the last known address of [the plaintiff] is
         unknown.’ ’’ All of these claims ‘‘were materially false,
         and [the defendant] knew [they] were materially false
         when he made them’’ because he knew that the mar-
           1
             The plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s
         residence was based on the following facts: (1) a tax bill for the property
         that was issued by the city and included the plaintiff’s correct address,
         which was a matter of public record; (2) a demand letter written by the
         defendant to the plaintiff, addressed to the plaintiff at 405 Helen Street in
         Bridgeport; (3) a letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff rejecting a
         payment the plaintiff tendered, which also was addressed to the plaintiff at
         405 Helen Street in Bridgeport; (4) a marshal’s return of service from a
         previous tax lien foreclosure action brought against the plaintiff by the
         defendant on behalf of Benchmark regarding real property taxes that were
         due on the property at 405 Helen Street, which stated that service was made
         on the plaintiff at his usual place of abode, 405 Helen Street in Bridgeport;
         and (5) evidence showing that the defendant had served the plaintiff with
         other documents at that address as well.
Page 36                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL               January 25, 2022

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