Although § 47a-23 (a) (3) is unambiguous in the present context, an examination of the statute as a whole further buttresses the conclusion that the notice to quit can occur simultaneously with the termination of the right or privilege to occupy. Section 47a-23 (a) (1) provides that when a lessor desires to obtain possession of a property and “when a rental agreement or lease of such property • • • terminates” for any of several enumerated reasons, the lessor “shall give notice to each lessee ... to quit possession or occupancy. . . .” Under this subsection, “[sjervice of a notice to quit possession is typically a landlord’s unequivocal act notifying the tenant of the termination of the lease.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn. App. 582, 587, 33 A.3d 802 (2011). If a notice to quit can be sufficient to terminate a lease, it follows, a fortiori, that a notice to quit can be sufficient under (a) (3) where an occupant has no continuing right to occupy and an owner can decide to terminate a tenancy at any time. Section 47a-23 (a) (2), which was added at the same time as (a) (3),4 also by its plain terms does not include any *195additional notice procedures beyond a notice to quit.5 Cf. General Statutes § 47a-15 (pretermination notice). The legislature did not expressly provide for any different procedure to apply to § 47a-23 (a) (3).6 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court properly determined that the notice to quit was valid. II