the notice did not identify any specific estate for which
the plaintiff purported to act as executor, which reduces
any likelihood that the defendants were confused or
misled as to the identity of the property owner or the
source of the notice. The defendants also concede that
all parties understood that the property was not a part
of the decedent’s estate. At oral argument, counsel for
the defendants likewise was unable to articulate any par-
ticular way in which the defendants were prejudiced by
the errant designation. Finally, the defendants did not
object to the plaintiff’s motion to substitute or assert any
new defenses or counterclaims after she was substituted
as the plaintiff in her individual capacity. In fact, the
defendants did not raise this defect until their appeal
to the Appellate Court, which further underscores that
they were not misled to their prejudice. See Bayer v.
Showmotion, Inc., supra, 292 Conn. 392.
In sum, we conclude that the defect in the notice to
quit did not deprive the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction. The notice to quit conveyed the essential
statutory information, and there is no indication that
the defendants were misled to their prejudice.8
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.