are “narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn.
482, 488, 733 A.2d 835 (1999).
Although summary process statutes are narrowly
construed and require strict adherence; Bayer v. Show-
motion, Inc., supra, 292 Conn. 388; the remedial provi-
sions of General Statutes § 52-1237 nonetheless apply to
notices to quit issued pursuant to § 47a-23 and excuse
circumstantial defects contained therein. Id., 389–90.
These principles work in tandem. Narrow construction
and strict compliance ensure that landlords adhere to
the essential statutory prerequisites governing notices
to quit under § 47a-23, whereas § 52-123 preserves oth-
erwise valid summary process proceedings from being
defeated by purely circumstantial defects. In determin-
ing whether a defect in a notice to quit is circumstan-
tial rather than substantive, we consider whether the
defendant had actual notice of the essential statutory
information required of such notice and whether the
defendant was in any way misled to his or her prejudice.
Id., 391. We also look to see whether the notice apprised
the tenant of the information needed to protect himself or
herself against “premature, discriminatory or arbitrary
eviction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Getty
Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 400,
107 A.3d 931 (2015).
Section 47a-23 (a), which sets forth the requirements
for a notice to quit, provides in relevant part that the
notice must be given by an “owner or lessor, or the own-
er’s or lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or
lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact . . . .” The defendants
argue that the notice to quit was issued by “Theresa K.
Freccia, Executor” and signed by Sank, in his capacity as
a representative for the estate/executor. The defendants
contend that, because neither the estate nor its executor
7
General Statutes § 52-123 provides: “No writ, pleading, judgment
or any kind of proceeding in court or course of justice shall be abated,
suspended, set aside or reversed for any kind of circumstantial errors,
mistakes or defects, if the person and the cause may be rightly under-
stood and intended by the court.”
Freccia v. Freccia