signatory while disregarding other language in the
notice. Section 47a-23 does not require that the notice
to quit include the owner’s name, but, if the plaintiff
chooses to include her name, a court may not ignore
that designation. Indeed, legal notices must be read as
a whole to determine what they reasonably convey. See,
e.g., Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 307 Conn. 728,
745, 59 A.3d 772 (2013); Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc.,
supra, 292 Conn. 392; Flynn v. First National Bank
& Trust Co. of New Haven, 131 Conn. 430, 433–34, 40
A.2d 770 (1944). Viewed in its entirety, the notice to quit
plainly conveys that the plaintiff, as “executor,” issued
the notice and that it was signed by her attorney, Sank.
The “executor” designation is an affirmative representa-
tion of the capacity in which the plaintiff purported to
proceed and in which Sank purported to represent her.
Accordingly, we agree with the defendants that the
notice to quit contains a defect, as it is undisputed that
the property was owned by the plaintiff in her individual
capacity, not by the estate.
Our determination that the notice to quit contains a
defect does not end the inquiry, however, because, as we
explained, not every defect in a notice to quit deprives
the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. In Bayer
v. Showmotion, Inc., supra, 292 Conn. 381, we explained
that, although a proper notice to quit is a condition prec-
edent to a summary process action; id., 388; § 52-123
applies to such notices and excuses circumstantial defects
contained therein. Id., 390. We concluded that the notice
to quit containing an erroneous quit date—one that had
already passed—presented only a circumstantial defect
and that the trial court, therefore, properly exercised
jurisdiction over the action. Id., 392. We noted that
the trial court had found “that other dates in the notice
to quit and in the plaintiff’s complaint provided actual
notice of the date on which the defendant was requested
to vacate the premises” and “that there was no confusion
surrounding that date.” Id. Further, we noted that “the
defendant’s failure to raise the defect in the notice to quit
for more than one year while it raised other defenses to
Freccia v. Freccia