court’s judgment of possession of certain premises in
Greenwich in favor of the plaintiff, Theresa K. Freccia.2
The sole issue presented in this certified appeal is whether
the Appellate Court correctly determined that the notice
to quit served on the defendants complied with General
Statutes § 47a-23 (a)3 and, thus, that the trial court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Although we
disagree with the Appellate Court that the notice to quit
strictly complied with the statute, we conclude that the
defect in the notice was circumstantial and, therefore,
did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
I
In 2018, Frank J. Freccia, Jr. (decedent), died. He and
his wife, the plaintiff, held title to the premises at issue
in this appeal known as 40 Locust Street, Building 2 and
2
The plaintiff commenced this summary process action in her capac-
ity as the executor of the estate of her husband, Frank J. Freccia, Jr.
Thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to substitute herself,
in her individual capacity, as the plaintiff.
3
General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) provides in relevant part: “When the
owner or lessor, or the owner’s or lessor’s legal representative, or the
owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact, desires to obtain pos-
session or occupancy of any land or building . . . and (1) when a rental
agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol,
terminates for any of the following reasons: (A) By lapse of time . . .
(D) nonpayment of rent within the grace period provided for residential
property in section 47a-15a or 21-83 . . . or (2) when such premises,
or any part thereof, is occupied by one who never had a right or privi-
lege to occupy such premises; or (3) when one originally had the right
or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has
terminated . . . such owner or lessor, or such owner’s or lessor’s legal
representative, or such owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact,
shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occu-
pancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least three
days before the termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any, or
before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit
possession or occupancy.”
Although § 47a-23 has been amended since the notice to quit was served
on the defendants; see, e.g., Public Acts, Spec. Sess., November, 2025,
No. 25-1, § 37; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this
appeal. For purposes of clarity and convenience, we refer to the current
revision of the statute.
Freccia v. Freccia