over the summary process action. Id., 379, 381. Specifi-
cally, they asserted that the property was owned by the
plaintiff, in her individual capacity, but the notice to
quit was signed by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff in
her capacity as executor of the estate of the decedent.
Id., 380. They further asserted that the estate was never
an owner of the property or an attorney for the owner of
the property and, thus, the notice to quit was defective
on its face. Id.
The plaintiff countered that the notice to quit was not
defective because, pursuant to § 47a-23 (a), the notice
need only have included the name of the owner’s legal
representative, attorney-at-law, or attorney-in-fact. Id.,
381. The plaintiff argued that the law does not require
the owner or the lessor of the property to be identified in
the notice to quit and that her attorney’s signature was
all that was needed to comply with the statute. See id. She
additionally claimed that, because the defendants did not
raise that issue before the trial court, it was impossible
to know whether the trial court considered her attorney,
who indisputably issued and signed the notice to quit, as
the attorney-at-law for her in her individual capacity as
owner of the property or as the attorney-at-law for her
in her capacity as executor, or both. Id.
The Appellate Court concluded that the notice to quit
served on the defendants complied with § 47a-23 (a). Id.,
386. The court observed that it was not disputed that
Sank represented the plaintiff both in her individual
capacity and in her capacity as executor of the decedent’s
estate. Id. It explained that, although the notice to quit
identified the party who brought the notice to quit as
“ ‘Theresa K. Freccia, Executor,’ ” it did not “expressly
identify the owner of the subject premises, let alone
state that the estate was the owner.” Id. The court rea-
soned that “[t]he fact that the notice stated that it was
being brought by the plaintiff as ‘[e]xecutor’ did not
detract from the fact that it identified Sank who was
the plaintiff’s attorney.” Id. The court explained that,
“[b]ecause it cannot be disputed that the notice to quit
Freccia v. Freccia