The plaintiff brought a summary process action, seeking to gain possession
of certain property after the defendants continued to occupy the property
beyond the expiration of the lease. The property, which was originally owned
by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s husband, F, as joint tenants, vested in
the plaintiff after F’s death. The plaintiff commenced her summary process
action in her capacity as “executor,” purportedly of F’s estate, and the notice
to quit that was served on the defendants, which was signed by the plaintiff’s
attorney, also indicated that it was being issued by the plaintiff in her capac-
ity as executor. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion
to substitute herself, in her individual capacity, as the plaintiff. The trial
court ultimately rendered judgment of possession for the plaintiff, from
which the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court. Before the Appellate
Court, the plaintiffs claimed for the first time that the notice to quit was
invalid and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the summary process action insofar as the notice to quit did not comply
with the statute (§ 47a-23 (a)) requiring that such notice be issued by either
the owner of the property or the owner’s legal representative, attorney-at-
law or attorney-in-fact. The defendants specifically contended that, when
the notice to quit was served on them, the plaintiff owned the property in
her individual capacity, but the notice was signed by counsel on behalf of
the plaintiff in her capacity as an executor. The Appellate Court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the notice to quit had complied
with § 47a-23 (a). On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed
to this court. Held: