the complaint demonstrates that it was not prejudiced
by the defect . . . .” Id.
Similarly, in Getty Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC,
supra, 315 Conn. 387, this court again considered a
challenge to the validity of various notices to quit, this
time based on the manner in which they were signed. Id.,
399–400. Specifically, the notices were signed not by the
plaintiffs’ attorney personally, but by an associate in the
attorney’s office, who signed the attorney’s name fol-
lowed by the associate’s own initials. Id. The defendants
argued that the notice failed to comply with § 47a-23 (a)
because the statute authorizes issuance of a notice by,
among other individuals, the owner’s attorney-at-law,
and, in their view, that authorization did not extend to an
associate signing on the attorney’s behalf. Id. We rejected
the defendants’ claim, explaining that it was undisputed
that the associate had authority to act on behalf of the
attorney and that the notices were, in substance, issued
under the attorney’s direction. Id., 400–401. We further
explained that there was no prejudice to the defendants.
Id., 401. Relying on Bayer, we concluded that “the trial
court was not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over
the plaintiffs’ summary process actions.” Id.
Applying those principles to the present case, we con-
clude that the defect in the notice was circumstantial
rather than substantive. The notice conveyed the essen-
tial statutory information, including the identity of the
property, the reason for the notice to quit, and the quit
date. The notice also identified the property’s actual
owner, “Theresa K. Freccia,” but mistakenly appended
the term “executor” to her name, and it was signed by
her attorney. Although the executor designation was
inaccurate, there is no indication that the defendants
were misled to their prejudice by this misnomer. See
Western Boot & Clothing Co. v. L’Enfance Magique, Inc.,
81 Conn. App. 486, 491–92, 840 A.2d 574 (concluding
that misnaming of plaintiff in notice to quit did not
deprive trial court of subject matter jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 269 Conn. 903, 852 A.2d 737 (2004). Notably,
Freccia v. Freccia