Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Citation
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Parent Document
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 2025-12-23
Other Sections in This Document (36)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
- Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau (2025)
Full Text
1,751 charsSupreme Court recently interpreted the phrase ‘‘ ‘based
. . . upon’ ’’ in § 42-150bb with respect to the amount
of the attorney’s fees awarded to a consumer. Centrix
Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg, supra, 349 Conn.
767. Specifically, it explained that this phrase was not
defined in the statutory language, and that the meanings
in various dictionaries in print at the time of the statute’s
enactment ‘‘all share a core principle: to base something
on another thing means to use the base as the founda-
tion.’’ Id., 772. The parties’ lease was neither the founda-
tion of the plaintiff’s summary process action nor the
reason that the defendants prevailed in that matter. See
Retained Realty, Inc. v. Spitzer, supra, 643 F. Supp.
2d 236. As we have explained, the plaintiff’s summary
process action was based on the plaintiff’s allegations
of conduct constituting a serious nuisance, which in
turn is premised on our statutes. Furthermore, the
defendants prevailed in the summary process action
not as a result of the parties’ lease, but because the
allegations against them were outside the statutory lan-
guage of § 47a-15 (a). The trial court specifically
explained that ‘‘the incidents were directed at indepen-
dent contractors of the plaintiff and do not fit the strict
confines of the serious nuisance statute.’’ (Emphasis
added.) For these reasons, we conclude that the trial
court properly denied the defendants’ motion for attor-
ney’s fees filed pursuant to § 42a-150bb.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.