cottage; it also concluded that the plaintiff should pay
a portion of past due assessments, and refused to award
attorney’s fees. Id., 258–59. With respect to the defen-
dants’ counterclaim, the court rendered judgment for
the plaintiff. Id., 265. It did so on the basis of inadequate
bylaws that were ‘‘impermissibly vague and without
standards.’’ Id., 260.
On appeal in Anderson, the plaintiff challenged, inter
alia, the trial court’s refusal to award him attorney’s
fees pursuant to § 42-150bb. ‘‘The trial court found that
the sublease here in issue, which provided for attorneys’
fees to the [defendant corporation], fell within this stat-
utory definition of a ‘lease’ but declined to award coun-
sel fees for the reason that the plaintiff had not success-
fully prosecuted a claim under the lease.’’ Id., 265. In
agreeing with the trial court’s reasoning, our Supreme
Court explained that the orders regarding ‘‘vegetation,
assessments, [corporation] membership and eviction
were all based on inadequacies found by the court in
the [corporation] bylaws and not in [considerations
involving] the sublease. Thus, the court was correct
in concluding that the plaintiff had not successfully
prosecuted his action under the lease.’’ Id. In other
words, to the extent that the plaintiff in Anderson had
prevailed, it was due to the inadequate bylaws and not
on considerations involving the sublease. Id., 266; see
also Retained Realty, Inc. v. Spitzer, 643 F. Supp. 2d
228, 236 (D. Conn. 2009) (explaining that attorney’s fees
under § 42-150bb are not available when party prevails
on claim for reasons other than opposing party’s breach
of contract).
Similarly, in Gardner Heights Health Care Center,
Inc. v. Korolyshun, 117 Conn. App. 745, 746–47, 982
A.2d 186 (2009), this court concluded that § 42-150bb
did not apply when the underlying action was a tort,
rather than a contract claim. In that case, the plaintiff
filed an action against the defendant alleging a breach
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