being a racist and pedophile and harassed him through
phone calls and disparaging behavior. . . . [The court
commented that her] behavior is well beyond her self-
described term of ‘immature’ and is not to be con-
doned.’’
As a result of these incidents, the plaintiff served
the defendants with a notice to quit possession of the
premises on July 13, 2022.2 The notice to quit stated that
Blau had committed a serious nuisance by ‘‘inflicting
bodily harm upon the [plaintiff’s] agents or threatening
to inflict such harm with the present ability to affect
such harm under the circumstances which would lead
a reasonable person to believe that such threat will
be carried out’’ as a result of her conduct toward the
employees of the towing company and the plaintiff’s
attorney. Furthermore, the notice to quit indicated that
Boudreau had committed a serious nuisance by vio-
lating General Statutes § 47a-11 (g) ‘‘by failing to require
other persons [namely, Blau] living in the premises with
[his] consent to conduct themselves in a manner that
will not constitute serious nuisance . . . .’’
The defendants did not vacate the premises, and the
plaintiff commenced a summary process action.3 The
2
A notice to quit terminates a lease and provides the jurisdictional basis
for a summary process action if the tenant does not vacate the premises
within the designated time. See Towers v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829, 840,
238 A.3d 732, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d 281 (2020); see also
Prime Management, LLC v. Arthur, 217 Conn. App. 737, 749, 290 A.3d 401
(2023); Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn. App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377,
cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988).
3
‘‘[S]ummary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide
an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of
leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which,
under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrong-
fully holding over their terms. . . . Summary process statutes secure a
prompt hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relat-
ing to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, 209 Conn.
App. 569, 575, 267 A.3d 927, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022);
see also St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728,
733, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011).
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