The defendants’ claim requires us to interpret § 42-
150bb and determine its applicability to the present
matter. Accordingly, we employ the plenary standard
of review. See Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valen-
cia, 145 Conn. App. 682, 687, 76 A.3d 694 (2013); see
also Kenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta, 161 Conn.
App. 668, 673, 129 A.3d 730 (2015); Athena Holdings,
LLC v. Marcus, 160 Conn. App. 470, 475, 125 A.3d 290,
cert. denied, 320 Conn. 908, 128 A.3d 952 (2015).7 We
follow the plain meaning rule pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 1-2z when construing statutes to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. See
Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC v. M & S Gateway
Associates, LLC, 340 Conn. 115, 126, 263 A.3d 87 (2021).
‘‘In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned
manner, the meaning of the statutory language as
applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question
of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In
seeking to determine that meaning . . . § 1-2z directs
us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such
text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of
the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Hous-
ing Finance Authority v. Alfaro, 328 Conn. 134, 141–42,
176 A.3d 1146 (2018).
We begin our analysis with the statutory language.
Section 42-150bb provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever
any contract or lease entered into on or after October
1, 1979, to which a consumer is a party, provides for
the attorney’s fee of the commercial party to be paid
by the consumer, an attorney’s fee shall be awarded
7
We disagree with the plaintiff’s contention in its appellate brief that the
abuse of discretion standard applies to the claims advanced by the defen-
dants in this appeal.
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