objection. They countered that the summary process
action was based on the parties’ lease.
On August 19, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision denying the defendants’ motion for attor-
ney’s fees. After reviewing § 42-150bb, and noting that
the lease had not been presented as an exhibit at the
summary process trial, the court determined that the
defendants were not entitled to attorney’s fees because
the summary process action was not based on the con-
tract, i.e., the lease, between the parties. Additionally,
the court concluded that, on the basis of the language
used in paragraph 19 of the lease, the plaintiff would
not have been entitled to attorney’s fees had it prevailed,
and, therefore, there was no reciprocal basis to award
the defendants such fees. Accordingly, it denied the
defendants’ motion. This appeal followed. Additional
facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the court
improperly denied their motion for attorney’s fees when
it concluded that (1) this summary process action was
outside of the scope of § 42-150bb and (2) the language
of the attorney’s fees provision in paragraph 19 of the
parties’ lease would not have supported an award of
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff had it prevailed in the
summary process action, and therefore no reciprocal
basis existed to award such fees to the defendants. The
plaintiff counters that the court’s conclusions regarding
the denial of the attorney’s fees were proper. We con-
clude that, in the present case, the trial court properly
determined that the notice to quit and the summary
process action filed by the plaintiff alleging serious
nuisance were not based on the lease between the par-
ties and, therefore, § 42-150bb does not apply in this
instance.6 Accordingly, the court properly denied the
defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees.
6
As a result of this conclusion, we need not reach the defendants’ second
claim that the trial court improperly determined that they were not entitled
to attorney’s fees due to the specific language in the parties’ lease.
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