of fiduciary duty as a conservator. The defendant pre-
vailed and sought attorney’s fees. In affirming the judg-
ment denying the motion for such fees, we stated: ‘‘The
underlying action here, however, was not a contract
claim but was a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, which
is a tort claim. . . . Accordingly, because § 42-150bb is
not applicable to the action at hand, the court properly
denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees.’’
(Citation omitted.) Id., 747.
In the present case, the plaintiff’s notice to quit and
summary process action were not based on a breach
of the parties’ lease but, rather, on Blau’s conduct that
was alleged to constitute a serious nuisance as defined
in our summary process statutes. As specifically stated
in the notice to quit, the plaintiff set forth a claim that
Blau had committed a serious nuisance by inflicting
bodily harm upon the plaintiff’s agents, or threatened
to inflict such harm under circumstances that would
lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat
would be carried out when Blau (1) threatened the
plaintiff’s towing agent and (2) assaulted the plaintiff’s
attorney. The plaintiff also asserted these claims in
counts one and two of its summary process complaint.
With respect to Boudreau, the plaintiff alleged in the
notice to quit and count three of its summary process
complaint that he had committed a serious nuisance
by violating § 47a-11 (g) by failing to require Blau to
conduct herself in a manner that would not constitute
a serious nuisance. The plaintiff sought to regain pos-
session of the premises on a statutory basis, as opposed
to a specific violation of the contract between the par-
ties.
Section 42-150bb expressly requires that the con-
sumer successfully prosecute or defend an action based
on the contract in order to be entitled to attorney’s fees
when there is a unilateral fee provision. See, e.g., Rizzo
Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, supra, 240 Conn. 71. Our
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