On May 21, 2024, the defendants moved for attorney’s
fees in the amount of $31,195 pursuant to § 42-150bb.5
In the attached memorandum of law, the defendants
argued that, as the prevailing parties, they were entitled
to such fees because paragraph 19 of the parties’ lease
provided that, if the plaintiff brought proceedings to
evict the defendants from the premises, it would be
entitled to ‘‘any attorney’s fees or other fees and costs
associated with the removal of [the defendants] . . . .’’
The defendants attached an affidavit of attorney’s fees
and a copy of the parties’ lease to their motion. The
defendants further asserted that, having demonstrated
their entitlement to attorney’s fees, the court had ‘‘no
latitude’’ to deny this motion.
On May 31, 2024, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. It argued
therein that the notice to quit, and the subsequent sum-
mary process action, were based on serious nuisance
and not a breach of the lease. Specifically, it asserted
that courts ‘‘have consistently recognized the indepen-
dent nature of a serious nuisance cause of action as
one that is borne out of statutory creation and exists
independently rather than as a product of the contrac-
tual relationship . . . .’’ It further argued that this statu-
tory basis for summary process existed even if the lease
were not valid, or if a lease did not exist at all. On June
17, 2024, the defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s
5
The defendants were represented by attorneys from New Haven Legal
Assistance Association, Inc. (NHLLA). In the defendants’ motion for attor-
ney’s fees, they asserted that NHLLA is a nonprofit organization that provides
free legal services to its clients. This court has recognized that, as a general
matter, such organizations are entitled to awards of attorney’s fees under
the appropriate circumstances. See generally Benavides v. Benavides, 11
Conn. App. 150, 152–56, 526 A.2d 536 (1987). We note that the plaintiff has
not challenged or disputed that NHLLA was eligible for an award of attorney’s
fees on the basis of its nonprofit status. Additionally, the trial court remarked
in its memorandum of decision that it ‘‘has regularly found that legal aid
societies are able to claim legal fees for the provision of their services.’’
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