premises, therefore, was not based on the terms or
language of the lease but, rather, on the provisions of
§§ 47a-11 (g) and 47a-15, which provide a remedy to
the landlord on the basis of acts alleged to be a serious
nuisance.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Lati-
mer Point Management Corp., 208 Conn. 256, 545 A.2d
525 (1988), provides helpful guidance in the present
matter. In that case, the plaintiff, a resident of Latimer
Point, Stonington, commenced an equitable action
against the defendant, a nonstock corporation created
to lease, sublease, maintain and improve the Latimer
Point peninsula, and fourteen present and past directors
of said corporation. Id., 257–59. The basis for the action
was the denial by the defendant corporation of the
plaintiff’s request to add a second story to his dwelling.
Id., 260. In that action, the plaintiff sought an injunction
that restrained the defendants from interfering with his
proposed use of the leased property in a number of
respects. Id. He also requested, among other things,
attorney’s fees. Id., 259. The defendants, in turn, filed a
counterclaim in which they sought an injunction against
the plaintiff with respect to the use of the property.
Id., 265.
In ruling on the plaintiff’s complaint, the trial court
found some issues in favor of the plaintiff and some
in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the trial court
enjoined the defendants from ‘‘(1) interfering with the
plaintiff’s maintenance of certain shrubs, trees and
other vegetation; (2) interfering with the plaintiff’s
membership in [the defendant corporation] upon his
payment of certain past due assessments; (3) pursuing
the collection or levy of past fines from the plaintiff;
and (4) pursuing a contemplated eviction of the plain-
tiff.’’ Id., 258. The court did not, however, grant an
injunction restraining the defendant corporation’s inter-
ference with his proposed second story addition to this
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