2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022)

Citation: 2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022)
Parent Document: 2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2022-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7861646/2710-sutter-ventures-llc-v-millis/ ↗

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must look to the whole purpose and scope of the legislative
scheme. There are three tests: ‘(1) the subject matter has been
so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly
indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern;
(2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law
couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount
state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action;
or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general
law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of
a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs
the possible benefit to the municipality.’ ” ’ ” (Johnson, supra,
137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 13–14.)
      Relying on Johnson and Coyne, plaintiffs argue that the Act
preempts section 37.9A(e)(4) because that provision imposes a
prohibitive price on a landlord’s right to exit the rental market.
With this argument, plaintiffs seek to invoke conflict, or
contradiction, preemption. (Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1226–1227 [“[T]he prohibitive price standard is the
appropriate standard to determine conflict [or contradiction]
preemption under the Ellis Act”].)
      In Johnson, this Division considered whether the Act
preempted part of the then-operative version of section
37.9A(e)(4), which required landlords to notify tenants of the
right to receive relocation assistance payments and “ ‘the amount
of payment which the landlord believes to be due.’ ” (Johnson,
supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11, 16.) The “belief requirement”
was the only part of section 37.9A(e)(4) at issue in Johnson.

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