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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)

Citation
Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)
Parent Document
Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)
Jurisdiction
DC (municipal)
Effective Date
1997-09-23

Other Sections in This Document (617)

Full Text

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As to my colleagues' reliance on our vacated and reinstated panel decision in Gray v. Citizens Bank of Washington, 602 A.2d 1096-97, opinion reinstated on denial of reh'g, 609 A.2d 1143 (D.C.1992), I view the language, that only the en banc court can extend an exception to the at-will doctrine, as the pronouncement of only one member of this court.[1] Even were this not so, this conclusion would not, could not, pass muster. It is contrary to the very essence of the common law as an evolving component of legal development and reasoning. A panel of our court cannot "legislate" to conclude that only our court en banc can expand or limit a common-law doctrine. Legal precedent is vital to the court system; however, it stands to reason that no panel of this court is in a posture to bind all future panels on future cases with very different facts and circumstances. Such broad dicta is beyond a panel's power and is suspect as precedent. I would ignore the dicta, pronounced in one of the three opinions of the panel[2] in Gray, and rule on the merits in this case. I would conclude that firing someone for testifying before the City Council on tort reform violates a clear mandate of public policy and therefore would create another limited wrongful discharge cause of action as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. I would remand for further consideration the question of whether discharging an employee for testifying as an expert in medical malpractice cases violates a clear mandate of public policy. Under either cause of action, appellant could have the opportunity of attempting to show that the termination was retaliatory and a defense pretextual. I.