Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)

Citation: Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)
Parent Document: Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1997-09-23
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2395626/carl-v-childrens-hospital/ ↗

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Moreover, the identification of public policy exceptions does not rise or fall upon the attenuation, or lack thereof, of a D.C.Code criminal provision.[2] In recent years, the threat of "retaliation" has found its way into federal protective employment legislation and case decisions. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(3)(a) (1994); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1994).[3] Thus only last term, our Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protected a discharged employee who alleged that his former employer gave a negative reference to a prospective employer in retaliation for *189 his having filed a charge against the former employer with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Thus in the broad sense, the principle that it is against public policy to retaliate against an employee for exercising a citizen's right or duty is solidly based in federal legislation as well as case law we are bound to recognize.

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