Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)

Citation: Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)
Parent Document: Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (1997)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1997-09-23
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2395626/carl-v-childrens-hospital/ ↗

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In my view, therefore, it would be most unwise for this court, sitting en bane as the highest court of the District of Columbia, to restrict, summarily and in an evidentiary vacuum, its own authority to recognize public policy exceptions to an ancient doctrine (tailored to another time and place) except where that policy is firmly anchored or solidly based in a present-day statute. In the first place, statutes with general preambles of intent (unlike courts which deal with individual but myriad factual situations), ofttimes spawn litigation in a search for the true articulation and possible application of public policy. Thus, it was, and is, that employees like Ms. Carl—both those that fit neatly into a protected category of a statute and those that do not—turn to the courts for what they consider to be unjust treatment, seeking damages or other relief. In answer thereto, both state and federal courts in the role of this common law heritage have identified, on a case by case basis, public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine. Moreover, this role is not a matter calling for abstract abstinence, since in spite of contractual or legislative protection, it is estimated that some 65% of the work force is still covered by the employment-at-will doctrine. Bennett-Alexander & Pincus, supra, at 11.

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