Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)

Citation: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Parent Document: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131855/michel-v-hartford/ ↗

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plaintiff bore the burden of pleading and proving ‘‘the
       non-existence of the material interference element’’ of
       § 31-51q. Id., 111.
           We adopt the well reasoned analysis set forth in Mat-
       thews, and we conclude that a plaintiff making a claim
       pursuant to § 31-51q does not have an affirmative bur-
       den to plead noninterference. Instead, a defendant may
       raise the issue of interference in a special defense. In
       reaching this conclusion, we find particularly persua-
       sive the recent decision of the United States District
       Court for the District of Connecticut in Mumma v.
       Pathway Vet Alliance, LLC, supra, 648 F. Supp. 3d 373.
       In Mumma, the court examined the reasoning in both
       Matthews and Coffy. Id., 391–92. The court explained
       that, because the question of who bears the burden on
       the interference element of § 31-51q had not yet been
       decided by a Connecticut appellate court, its role was
       to try to predict how our Supreme Court would resolve
       the issue. Id., 391; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633
       Third Associates, 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994)
       (‘‘[w]here the substantive law of the forum state is
       uncertain or ambiguous, the job of the federal courts
       is carefully to predict how the highest court of the forum
       state would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity’’). The
       court then predicted that our Supreme Court would
       adopt the reasoning of Matthews and would not follow
       the decision in Coffy. Mumma v. Pathway Vet Alliance,
       LLC, supra, 391–92.
         The court in Mumma found the Coffy decision unper-
       suasive because, although it contained a discussion of
       the proviso/exception distinction, it failed to contest
       the practical considerations identified in Matthews. Id.,
       391. The court in Mumma also observed that ‘‘dog bite
       plaintiffs and [§] 31-51q claimants are not similarly situ-
       ated; whereas the former likely knows whether he was
       committing a tort at the time he was attacked, the latter
       almost invariably does not have the same knowledge of
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