Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)

Citation: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Parent Document: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131855/michel-v-hartford/ ↗

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upon that right, and a plaintiff, to avail himself of the
          benefit of the statute, must show that he comes within
          the limited class for whose benefit the right was estab-
          lished, the burden of proof in this respect being upon
          him. . . . As the statute now reads, we hold that a
          complaint thereunder should, by proper allegations,
          negative the existence of circumstances which would
          bring the plaintiff within the exception . . . .’’ (Cita-
          tions omitted.) Goodwin v. Giovenelli, supra, 107.
             The court in Coffy determined that it ‘‘consider[ed]
          the statutory exception in the statute addressed in
          Goodwin to be functionally equivalent to the proviso
          in § 31-51q. Both statutes contain an enacting clause
          which creates a right of action for a plaintiff. In the
          factual scenario of the current case, the proviso within
          the enacting clause limits the scope of the right created
          by precluding the employee from suing when the
          employee’s conduct, although otherwise being pro-
          tected under the statute, substantially or materially
          interferes with the employee’s job performance or the
          employee-employer working relationship. The proviso
          in § 31-51q forms an integral part of the statute and is
          a limitation on the right created by it. The only patent
          difference between the statutes, is that the statute in
          Goodwin uses the term ‘except’ to begin the ‘exception’
          and § 31-51q uses the term ‘provided’ to begin the ‘pro-
          viso.’ In this case, that distinction has no impact because
          the function of both provisions, as just discussed, is
          the same. The function of the ‘exception’ in the dog-
          bite statute and the ‘proviso’ in § 31-51q is to place a
          limitation on the right created by each statute. Further-
          more, no one would argue that if § 31-51q instead used
          the phrase, ‘except if such activity substantially or mate-
          rially interferes with’ that its plain textual meaning
          would be any different.’’ Coffy v. State, supra, 71 Conn.
          L. Rptr. 110–11. Applying the reasoning set forth in
          Goodwin, the court in Coffy thus determined that the
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