Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)

Citation: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Parent Document: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131855/michel-v-hartford/ ↗

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conclusion that the plaintiff’s speech in the present
       case, given its form and context, involved a matter of
       public concern.
         Accordingly, we conclude that the court improperly
       determined that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege
       that his speech addressed a matter of public concern.
       Therefore, we conclude that the court improperly
       granted the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s
       § 31-51q claims set forth in count two and count three
       of the operative complaint on this ground.
                                            B
          The plaintiff also argues that, contrary to the court’s
       conclusion, he was not required to plead that his speech
       did not substantially or materially interfere with his job
       performance or the working relationship between him
       and his employer and that ‘‘[i]t makes far more sense
       for the burden to fall on the defendant to raise interfer-
       ence as a special defense.’’ The defendant responds that
       the court properly concluded that the plaintiff must
       affirmatively plead noninterference, as an essential ele-
       ment of § 31-51q, and that the allegations in the opera-
       the context of criminal trials and, as already noted, it concerned corruption
       in a public program and misuse of state funds, which the court concluded
       ‘‘obviously’’ involved a matter of public concern. Lane v. Franks, supra, 573
       U.S. 241.
          In addition, the plaintiff in Lane had been compelled by subpoena to
       testify. Id., 238. Despite this distinction, the plaintiff in the present case
       argues that his testimony was constitutionally protected even though he
       provided it voluntarily. Our research reveals that the plaintiff’s argument
       has at least some support from certain federal courts of appeal, which have
       focused on the broader policy considerations of Lane rather than whether
       the speech at issue was compelled testimony. See Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th
       270, 277 n.3 (5th Cir. 2022) (‘‘[w]hether [the plaintiff] submitted [a sworn]
       statement voluntarily or under pain of punishment is not decisive, given
       that the policy rationale underlying Lane is to incentivize public employees
       to come forward with truthful information about corruption among public
       officials’’); see also Dougherty v. School District of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d
       979, 990 (3d Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that holding of Lane was limited
       to context of compelled testimony).
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