Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)

Citation: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Parent Document: Michel v. Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131855/michel-v-hartford/ ↗

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placing the burden on the defendant to plead a substan-
       tial and material interference as a special defense, the
       defendant is able to allege specific facts concerning any
       incidents of disruption because, as the employer, it has
       a wider and better knowledge of disruptive events. This
       creates a situation well suited for an affirmative
       defense, and, in light of the case law, interpretation of
       the statutory text and confines of logic, it makes more
       sense that it is the defendant’s burden to prove a sub-
       stantial and material interference.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
       Matthews v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra, 56 Conn. L.
       Rptr. 268.
          The defendant contends that we should, instead, fol-
       low the analysis of the Superior Court in Coffy v. State,
       supra, 71 Conn. L. Rptr. 109. In Coffy, the court analo-
       gized § 31-51q to Connecticut’s dog bite statute and
       pointed to our Supreme Court’s analysis of the dog bite
       statute in Goodwin v. Giovenelli, 117 Conn. 103, 167
       A. 87 (1933). At the time of the Goodwin decision, the
       dog bite statute imposed liability on the owner or keeper
       of any dog for damage by the dog to persons or property,
       ‘‘except where such damage shall have been occasioned
       to the body or property of a person who, at the time
       such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass
       or other tort.’’18 General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 3357; see
       Goodwin v. Giovenelli, supra, 105 n.1. As emphasized
       by the court in Coffy, the Goodwin decision held that
       the plaintiff bore the burden to plead and prove that
       he was not committing a trespass or other tort at the
       time of the dog attack, reasoning that, ‘‘[w]here an
       exception forms an integral part of that portion of a
       statute which creates a right, it becomes a limitation
          18
             The current revision of the dog bite statute similarly imposes liability
       ‘‘except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property
       of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing
       a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog.’’
       General Statutes § 22-357 (b).
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