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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Brook Run Development Corp. v. Noon, 230 Conn. App. 424 (2025)

Citation
Brook Run Development Corp. v. Noon, 230 Conn. App. 424 (2025)
Parent Document
Brook Run Development Corp. v. Noon, 230 Conn. App. 424 (2025)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2025-01-28

Other Sections in This Document (35)

Full Text

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utilities the plaintiff has agreed to pay, and paragraph
       7 then provides that the plaintiff may enter the premises
       at reasonable times for the purpose of making necessary
       repairs to ‘‘the utilities or services that we have agreed
       to supply.’’
          The lease, including within paragraph 10 (A), also
       clearly and consistently delineates the respective
       responsibilities that have been agreed to by the plaintiff
       and the defendant, by referencing the former using the
       terms ‘‘we’’ and ‘‘us’’ and the latter by using the term
       ‘‘you.’’ Therefore, although the lease itself is an agree-
       ment that requires the assent of both parties, paragraph
       10 (A) establishes that the lease will automatically
       renew unless the plaintiff decides in writing not to
       renew the lease—or the defendant vacates the prem-
       ises. Put differently, paragraph 10 (A) gives alternative
       mechanisms for each party to sever the relationship
       established by the lease, notwithstanding the use of the
       noun ‘‘agreement.’’ Given the consistent usage of ‘‘us’’
       and ‘‘agree’’ throughout the lease, the trial court’s deter-
       mination of paragraph 10 (A) as clear and unambiguous
       is correct.
          Further, construed in terms of the entirety of the
       lease, the lack of a rent escalation provision further
       supports the conclusion that the parties did not intend
       to enter into a perpetual relationship with one another,
       over the objection of the other party, at the same rental
       rate for all time. Paragraph 18 clearly establishes that
       either party can give notice of termination to the other,
       once the tenancy has shifted to a monthly agreement.
       For purposes of terminating the automatic renewal pro-
       vision at the end of the lease term, paragraph 10 (A)
       provides for either party to exercise that option by
       requiring the plaintiff to sign a writing and the defendant
       to simply vacate the premises. We note as well that we
       are reluctant to construe a contract in ‘‘such a way that
       it would lead to an absurd result.’’ (Internal quotation
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