Brook Run Development Corp. v. Noon, 230 Conn. App. 424 (2025)

provision superfluous. . . . Therefore, [w]hen inter-
         preting a contract, we must look at the contract as a
         whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if
         possible, give operative effect to every provision in
         order to reach a reasonable overall result.’’ (Internal
         quotation marks omitted.) Id., 322. ‘‘[T]he mere fact
         that the parties advance different interpretations of the
         language in question does not necessitate a conclusion
         that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation
         marks omitted.) Poole v. Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68, 88,
         831 A.2d 211 (2003). Where a term is used interchange-
         ably throughout an agreement, though, such that two
         plausible interpretations are possible, such a term will
         be construed as ambiguous. See Isham v. Isham, 292
         Conn. 170, 184, 972 A.2d 228 (2009). ‘‘The individual
         clauses of a contract, however, cannot be construed by
         taking them out of context and giving them an interpre-
         tation apart from the contract of which they are a part.’’
         Levine v. Advest, Inc., 244 Conn. 732, 753, 714 A.2d
         649 (1998).
            We note that the defendant effectively asks us to
         construe the language of paragraph 10 (A) so as to grant
         a right to perpetual renewal of the lease, in the absence
         of the agreement of both parties to terminate the lease.
         ‘‘[T]he right to perpetual renewal of a lease is not forbid-
         den by the law . . . . Courts do not favor perpetual
         leases, however; thus a provision in a lease will not be
         construed as conferring a right to a perpetual renewal
         unless the language is so plain as to admit of no doubt
         of the purpose to provide for perpetual renewal.’’ (Cita-
         tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lon-
         ergan v. Connecticut Food Store, Inc., 168 Conn. 122,
         124–25, 357 A.2d 910 (1975).10 Our Supreme Court, in
            10
               As our Supreme Court noted, there are certain key phrases and words
         that clearly signal an intent to create a perpetually renewing lease, such as
         ‘‘forever, for all time, and in perpetuity, words whose presence or absence
         in a lease is of considerable significance to a court in deciding whether a
         right of perpetual renewal was intended by the parties.’’ (Internal quotation
         marks omitted.) Lonergan v. Connecticut Food Store, Inc., supra, 168 Conn.
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