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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

§ 1-2z

Citation
§ 1-2z
Parent Document
PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2024-08-12

Other Sections in This Document (198)

Full Text

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the building was ‘‘[u]nfit for [h]uman [o]ccupancy.’’
       Once the defendant issued that order, the residents
       became displaced as a ‘‘direct result of code enforce-
       ment activities’’ under § 8-267 (3) (B). This is the most
       sensible reading in light of the legislatively declared
       purpose of the act, which includes ‘‘establish[ing] a uni-
       form policy for the fair and equitable treatment of per-
       sons displaced . . . by building code enforcement
       activities . . . .’’ General Statutes § 8-266. Even though
       the arson destroyed the property, there was some dan-
       ger that residents of the building would seek to return
       if they had no other place for shelter. It was the defen-
       dant’s code enforcement that directly resulted in the
       displacement of the tenants.
         Although damage from the fire made the apartment
       building uninhabitable physically and legally, those two
       determinations are not always necessarily one and the
       same. For example, the existence of mold growing in
       an apartment building might make the building legally
       uninhabitable; see General Statutes § 47a-7; but may go
       unnoticed by residents who might choose to stay in the
       building despite the health risk because they have no
       other shelter options. In this scenario, too, it would not
       be the underlying cause behind the code violation (the
       mold) that prompted residents to move. Rather, if the
       defendant, in enforcing its code, ordered that residents
       could not occupy the building, the residents would be
       displaced as a ‘‘direct result’’ of the code enforcement.
       General Statutes § 8-267 (3) (B). This reality underscores
       the shortcomings of the plaintiff’s logic and further
       supports an interpretation of § 8-267 (3) (B) that consid-
       ers only code enforcement activities when determining
       the cause of displacement under the act.
          Thus, we disagree with the trial court that the resi-
       dents ‘‘move[d]’’ from the building ‘‘as the direct result
       of’’ arson, not ‘‘as the direct result of [the defendant’s] code
       enforcement activities . . . .’’ General Statutes § 8-267
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